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OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MORTON INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
a corporation,
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Case No.

SOUTHERN PACIFIC
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant - Respondent.
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Morton International, Inc. (hereinafter referred to
as "Morton"), brought this action against the Southern
Pacific Transportation Company (hereinafter referred to
as "Southern Pacific") for damages and injunctive relief
to remedy alleged diminution of the salt content in the
southern half of the Great Salt Lake (hereinafter referred
to as the "Lake"), allegedly caused by the construction of
a causeway across the Lake by the Southern Pacific.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court, the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins
presiding, granted a Motion for Summary Judgment by
1

the Southern Pacific on May 12, 1971, and an Order to
that effect was entered on May 25, 1971.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Morton seeks reversal of the summary judgment entered against it by Judge Wilkins and the remand of the
case to the lower court for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
It was stipulated to the District Court that there were
no issues of material facts remaining to be determined
which would preclude the court from ruling on Southern
Pacific's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 369-70).
Focusing on the agreed upon material facts, they are
briefly:
Plaintiff owns land on the south end of the Great
Salt Lake. Certain of plaintiff's predecessors in interest diverted water from the Great Salt Lake and removed salt
therefrom prior to the effective date of the Water Filing
Act of 1903. Plaintiff and the Utah State Land Board
executed an agreement dated September 17, 1954. (R.
206-12) Plaintiff has not filed an application for, and does
not have, a certificate for the appropriation of water from
the Great Salt Lake for the purpose of the processing or
removal of salt therefrom. The State of Utah and the
State Land Board on December 31, 1967, asserted in their
Counterclaim against plaintiff in Morton International,
Inc. v. State of Utah, Civil No. C 127-66 that:

2

" '1. Plaintiff is withdrawing and processing or
using water from the Great Salt Lake without any
authority to do so, and plaintiff has executed a
certain agreement with the State of Utah, acting
by and through the State Land Board, dated September 17, 1954, which agreement is still in force
and effect, and which agreement provides in paragraph No. 2 thereof that plaintiff is obligated to
comply fully with Title 73, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, relative to making applications for the diversion or withdrawal of any waters of the Great
Salt Lake, and plaintiff has failed and refused to
comply with said laws and has filed no application to appropriate or otherwise utilize said
waters, and has therefore breached said agreement
and should be enjoined and prevented from further
withdrawing and processing or using any waters
of the Great Salt Lake for any purpose whatsoever.

'2. The generally recognized common law
rule of state ownership of waters within the State
of Utah, as well as numerous statutory pronouncements by the Utah State Legislature, recognize and
show that the title to all waters within the State of
Utah are owned and administered by the State by
and through the office of the Utah State Engineer,
and no waters can legally be diverted, withdrawn
or used without appropriate filings, applications,
or other appropriate documents with the office
of said State Engineer; and plaintiff has failed and
refused to make any application whatsoever with
the office of the Utah State Engineer which would
entitle or authorize it to withdraw or use any of
the waters of the Great Salt Lake, and plaintiff
should therefore be enjoined, restrained and prevented from withdrawing any of the waters of said
lake unless and until it takes proper steps to obtain rights to withdraw such water.
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'WHEREFORE, these defendants pray for a
judgment and decree under Count II of the Counterclaim enjoining, restraining and preventing
plaintiff from further withdrawing any waters
from the Great Salt Lake until such time as plaintiff has fully complied with it (sic) contractual
obligation with the State of Utah and with the
common law ownership of the State of Utah of the
waters of the Great Salt Lake.' "
The said agreement of September 17, 1954, was entered
into to settle litigation between the State of Utah and
plaintiff" 'without prejudice to the rights claimed by each
and without admission of the validity or invalidity of the
claims asserted by each . . .' " Since the date of said
agreement of September 17, 1954, Morton has paid royalties to the State of Utah for salt removed from the Great
Salt Lake. It continued to do so after filing its Complaint
against the State in Morton International, Inc. v. State of
Utah, supra, and after the state filed its said Counterclaim. (R 303-05)
ISSUES PRESENTED
The paramount issue involved herein is whether
Judge Wilkins was correct in ruling in effect that Morton
has no right to the salt contained in the water of the Lake
upon which to base its action for damages and injunctive
relief against Southern Pacific. In deciding this overriding issue, the following sub-issues are involved:
1. Are the asserted diligence rights upon which Mor-

ton bases its right to appropriate water from the Lake
valid in light of the decision in Deseret Livestock Co. v.
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State, 110 Utah 239, 171 P.2d 401 (1946) that removal
of water from the Lake for the sole purpose of extracting
salt therefrom is not a beneficial use unless the entity removing said water had rights to the salt contained therein granted by the State of Utah?
2. Does Morton have rights to the salt in the water
of the Lake from the State of Utah under the Royalty
Agreement dated September 17, 1954, in view of Morton's
admitted failure to obtain, or even apply for a water appropriation certificate as required by the said agreement;
Title 73, Utah Code Annotated (1953), and Section 651-15, Utah Code Annotated (1953)?
3. If, as Morton claims, it has valid water appropriation rights as well as a valid Royalty Agreement from the
State of Utah, is the Royalty Agreement a non-exclusive
license to purchase salt from the State of Utah which
gives Morton no proprietary interest therein until Morton
has reduced the salt to possession?
4. Does Section 65-1-15, Utah Code Annotated
(1953) subject whatever rights Morton may have under
the Royalty Agreement to the use for public purposes of
the water of the Lake by the Southern Pacific for its railroad causeway?

5

ARGUMENT
POINT

I.

IN ORDER FOR MORTON TO HAVE A
RIGHT TO THE SALT CONTAINED IN THE
WATER OF THE GREAT SALT LAKE UPON
WHICH TO BASE ITS ACTION, IT MUST
HAVE:
A.

A V AUD RIGHT TO REMOVE THE
WATER FROM THE LAKE, AND

B.

A VALID ROYALTY AGREEMENT
WITH THE STATE OF UTAH TO REMOVE THE SALT FROM THE WATER.

That the State of Utah owns the salt and other minerals contained in the water of the Lake is unquestionable.
Under the established constitutional principle of equality
of the states, title to the beds of all streams and lakes
which were navigable at the time of Utah's Statehood
passed to the State. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893);
United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1930); Deseret Livestock Co. v. State, 110 Utah 239, 171 P.2d 401 (1946);
Robinson v. Thomas, 75 Utah 446, 286 Pac. 625 (1930);
State v. Rolio, 71 Utah 91, 262 P.2d 987 (1927). That the
Lake was navigable at Utah's Statehood was recently affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Utah v.
United States, ________ U.S. ________ , 91 S. Ct. 1775 0971).
Because of Utah's ownership of the bed of the Lake,
it also owns the salt and other minerals contained in the
6

water located over it under the explicit holding by this
Court in Deseret Livestock Co. v. State, supra. In Deseret
Livestock, the plaintiff alleged, among other things, that
the State did not own the minerals contained in water
subject to appropriation, which included the Great Salt
Lake. This Court, after taking judicial notice of the navigability of the Lake, rejected plaintiff's claim. The Court
determined that the salt was a natural substance having
sufficient value to be mined or extracted for its own specific use, and hence, was a mineral separate and apart
from the water in which it was contained. Since the water
and the salt contained therein were separate entities, the
Court ruled that Utah's water appropriation laws applied
only to the water and not to the salt. Attemped appropriation of the water for the sole purpose of removing salt
created no right to the salt in the Lake by the purported
appropriator.
To determine who owned the minerals contained in
the water of the Lake, the Court followed its prior holding in Utah Copper Co. v. Montana Bingham Consolidated Mining Co., 69 Utah 423, 255 Pac. 672 (1926),
wherein it had held that whoever owned the property
upon which mineral-bearing water was located also owned the minerals. It followed that since the State of Utah
owned the bed of the Lake, it also owned the salt and
other minerals contained in the water over its bed, and
no right to the salt could be obtained without a specific
grant from the State.

7

POINT

I. A.

MORTON HAS NO V AUD RIGHT TO REMOVE WATER FROM THE GREAT SALT
LAKE.
As stated by Morton on page 8 of its brief, the only
water right relied upon by it is a so-called "diligence
1
right" based upon the fact its predecessors withdrew
water from the Lake since at least 1888. Despite Morton's
assertions to the contrary, as well as the historical material
included in its brief, which, although interesting, is irrelevant to the issues at hand, the case of Deseret Livestock v. State, supra, clearly shows that said alleged diligence rights are invalid for the reason that diversion of
water from the Lake even prior to Statehood for the sole
purpose of extracting salt and other minerals therefrom is
not and never has been a beneficial use of the water.
Morton attempts to circumvent this holding by alleging
1 To place this in context, it must be noted that the law of appropriation has always governed the use of water in Utah. Robinson v. Thomas,
supra. Prior to 1903, water could be appropriated only by turning or
directing it from its natural channel and putting it to a beneficial use.
In 1903, the Utah Legislature passed Section 47, Chapter 100, Laws of
Utah (1903) which declared the waters of the State of Utah, whether
above or under the ground, to be the property of the public. The Legislature also passed Section 34 of Chapter 100, which declared that water
thenceforth could be appropriated only by complying with Utah statutory
law. The law after 1903 is set forth in Fairfield Irrigation Co. v. Carson,
122 Utah 225, 247 P.2d 1004 (1952):

Since the effective date of S.L. 1903, c. JOO, sec. 34, it is established that the right to the use of unappropriated flowing streams
of this state cannot be acquired without first filing an application
therefor in the State Engineer's office. Deseret Livestock Co. v.
Hoopiania, 66 Utah 25, 239 P.479; Adams v. Portage Irr. Res. &
P. Co., 95 Utah l, 72 P.2d 648; Smith v. Sanders, 112 Utah 517, 189
P.2d 701, and Hanson v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 404, 205 P.2d 255,
259 to 261. [p. 233]
Morton has admitted neither it nor any of its predecessors have filed
such an application; hence, it must rely upon its alleged rights prior to
to 1903, as it attempts to do.
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that Deseret Livestock did not deal with appropriation
from the Lake prior to Statehood such as practiced by
Morton and its predecessors, and therefore it is inapplicable. Such is not the case. The issue of whether attempted
appropriation prior to Statehood for the purpose of removing salt gave rights in the water and the salt to the
appropriator was precisely the issue decided in Deseret
Livestock. Because of the importance of this fact, we quote
from the following pages of Deseret Livestock's brief on
appeal:
Salt water was appropriated and used [by
Deseret Livestock Co.] for the purpose of extracting salts and minerals therefrom prior to the
adoption of our Constitution. Our constitution
provided in Article 17 Section 1: 'All existing
rights to use any of the waters in this State, for
any useful or beneficial purpose, are hereby recognized and confirmed.' Here the constitution confirms the use for which plaintiff seeks to appropriate this water as proper and beneficial. [pp. 10-11]
We have also pointed out that the right to appropriate the waters of the Great Salt Lake, and
apply the same to a beneficial use, such as that
proposed by the Appellant, was practiced and recognized before the constitution of this State was
adopted, and has therefore been by the constitution
expressly recognized and protected as a water
right and a method of applying water to a beneficial use. [p. 27] [Emphasis added]
In addition, Exhibit "A" to Deseret Livestock Company's Complaint, which was a part of the Record before
this Court stated on page 3 that:

This appropriation is an old appropriation originally made prior to 1903 for the purpose of re-
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covering the salt and the mineral content of the
water appropriated.
Thus, this Court was squarely presented with the
issue of whether diversion of the water from the Lake
prior to 1903 as well as prior to Statehood gave Deseret
Livestock rights in the salt contained in the Lake and
whether appropriation of water and other minerals therefrom was in fact a beneficial use. This Court held that:
Since the state is the owner of the salt contained in the waters of the Great Salt Lake, it
follows that appellant is in no position, until it
acquires rights to the salt therein, to place that
water to a beneficial use as its sole purpose for its
attempted appropriation is to extract the salt from
the water. If it cannot place the water to a beneficial use it cannot appropriate the water because
beneficial use is the only basis upon which water
can be appropriated in this state. It also follows
that as the state is the owner of the salt the 1941
Amendments to Section 86-1-15, R.S.U. 1933, and
Section 100-3-8, R.S.U. 1933, are not unconstitutional because they take no right which could
have been acquired by the filing of an application for the appropriation of water before their
enactment, but merely provide a method by which
rights to the salt may be acquired from the State
Land Board and thus place one in a position to put
the water to a beneficial use and also provide a
check with the State Engineer so that no water
may be appropriated from navigable bodies of
water, the beds of which belong to the state, for
the sole purpose of taking therefrom the minerals
which do not belong to the appropriator. Deseret
Livestock, supra, at pp. 244-45.

10

This holding is consistent with constitutional principles, because unlike the extensive public domain arguments relied upon by Morton in its brief,2 navigable
waters, and the beds thereto [and the minerals contained
in such waters] were held by the Federal Government in
trust for the future states. Shively v. Bowlby, supra.
In that case, the United States Supreme Court stated at
pages 49 and 50 that:
The Congress of the United States, in disposing of the public lands, has constantly acted
upon the theory that those lands, whether in the
interior, or on the coast, above high water mark,
may be taken up by actual occupants, in order to
encourage the settlement of the country; but that
the navigable waters and the soils under them,
whether within or above the ebb and flow of the
tide, shall be and remain public highways; and,
being chiefly valuable for the public purposes of
commerce, navigation and fishery, and for the
improvements necessary to secure and promote
these purposes, shall not be granted away during
the period of territorial government; but unless in
the case of some international duty or public exigency, shall be held by the United States in trust
for the future States, and shall vest in the several
States, when organized and admitted to the Union,
with all the powers and prerogatives appertaining
to the older States in regard to such waters and
soils within their respective jurisdictions, in short,
shall not be disposed of piecemeal to individuals
as private property, but shall be held as a whole
for the purpose of being ultimately administered
and dealt with for the public benefit by the State,
after it shall have become a completely organized
community. [Emphasis added]
2 pp.

8-20
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Therefore, the Federal Government could not, by
design or inadvertence, grant rights to navigable waters
or minerals contained therein. All such rights were "held
as a whole" for the State upon its entry into the Union.
Morton's argument to the contrary is invalid. And since
Morton's purported diligence rights were not a beneficial
use under the explicit holding in Deseret Livestock, it has
no right to appropriate water from the Great Salt Lake;
its claim herein must fail, and the decision rendered below
affirmed.
POINT

I. B.

MORTON'S PURPORTED ROYALTY
AGREEMENT WITH THE STATE OF UTAH
IS INVALID.
Morton also bases its claim of right to the salt contained in the Lake upon a Royalty Agreement it entered
into on September 17, 1954, with the State of Utah
through the State Land Board. Morton has no rights
thereunder upon which to base its claim.
Section 65-1-15, Utah Code Annotated (1953), provides in part that:
and provided further that before executing a contract which contemplates the recovery of salts and
minerals from said waters [of the Lake], the state
land board shall require evidence that an application for the appropriation of water for such purposes has been filed with the state engineer and is
pending in his office. [Emphasis added]
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Morton admits that neither it nor its predecessors
have ever filed an application for a water appropriation
certificate with the State Engineer. Absent this prerequisite, which is reiterated in the said agreement of September 17, 1954, the Agreement is void and of no effect as a
matter of law.
Morton protests at some length 3 that Southern Pacific
should not be allowed to show the fatal defects underlying
and invalidating its asserted rights which it is asking this
Court to enforce. Morton argues that Southern Pacific
cannot point out the "unlawfulness" of its activities, and
that the Court should close its eyes to the same. The absurdity of the argument is apparent on its face. Moreover,
the argument itself is not particularly germane. The
question before the Court is whether or not Morton has
done what is necessary under the laws of this state to
establish in it some valid right, some protectable interest.
If it has not, it has no cause of action.
An analogous situation was presented m Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power and
Light Co., 440 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1971). In that case,
plaintiff was generating and selling electric power to tenants of the Cottonwood Mall. When Utah Power started
to sell to some of plaintiff's customers, plaintiff commenced the action, alleging an attempt to monopolize and
injury to its business. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
District Court's Summary Judgment for defendant on the
ground that plaintiff had not obtained the right from the
3 Appellant's

brief pp. 27-29.
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appropriate state agency to engage in the business it
sought to protect. On the ground that plaintiff had not
obtained a certificate of convenience from the Utah Public
Service Commission, the Circuit Court affirmed the District Court's holding:
[T]he Cottonwood would need a certificate before
it could press its claims, for if it had no right to
sell electricity, then by definition Power Company
could not interfere with this "right." 440 F.2d at
p. 38.
The same logic applies to Morton's position. Since
it has no valid certificate of appropriation for water and
has no valid royalty contract for the purchase of salt, it
has no right that Southern Pacific could have interfered
with. The judgment below should be sustained.
POINT

II.

MORTON, AS A NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSEE OF THE STATE OF UTAH, HAS NO
RIGHT TO MAINTAIN A SUIT FOR THE
REMOVAL OF SALT FROM THE GREAT
SALT LAKE.
Assuming arguendo that the Royalty Agreement of
September 17, 1954, is valid, Morton would have no right
to complain of the migration of salt in the waters of the
Lake allegedly caused by the Southern Pacific or of the
removal of salt by the other entities who extract salt from
the Lake under similar Royalty Agreements because the
Royalty Agreement constitutes a non-exclusive license.
Contrary to Morton's assertion on page 33 of its brief,
14

the nature of a license agreement is not primarily characterized by its revocability, but by whether the instrument grants an exclusive or non-exclusive right in the
grantee to remove the minerals in question.
It is an established doctrine of law that if the instrument grants a non-exclusive right, it cannot be classified
as a lease, but must be classified as a license. United
States v. Atomic Fuel Coal Co., 383 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1967);
United States v. 180.37 Acres of Land, More or Less, 254
F. Supp. 209 (D. Va. 1966); In re Red Owl Drug Co., 12
F. Supp. 439 (D. Nev. 1935); Atkins v. Sonoma County,
55 Cal. Reptr. 785 (1966), aff'd., 60 Cal. Reptr. 499, 430
P.2d 57 (1967); Von Goerlitz v. Turner, 65 Cal. App. 2d
475, 150 P.2d 278 (1944); Case v. Kadota Fig Ass'n., 207
P.2d 86 (1949), modified, 220 P.2d 912 (1950); Combined Metals Reduction Co. v. Industrial Commission, IOI
Utah 230, 116 P.2d 929 (1940); San Juan Gold Co. v. San
Juan Ridge Mutual Water Ass'n., 34 Cal. App. 2d 159,
93 P.2d 582 (1939); Herigstad v. Hardrock Oil Co., 101
Mont. 22, 52 P.2d 171 (1953). It has been squarely held
that the doctrine applies to mining cases as well as to
other types of cases. London Extension Mining Co. v. Ellis,
134 F.2d 405 (10th Cir. 1943). This Court followed the
other courts in holding that without exclusive possession
the instrument creates a license rather than a lease. In
Combined Metals Reduction Company v. Industrial Commission, supra, the Court ruled:
In the instant case the lessee does not obtain
exclusive possession. He simply obtains, subject

15

to cancellation, or possession for an indefinite
time, the right to work on and in the premises, the
right to explore for ore. It is a license to mine as
defined in 40 C. J. p. 991, Sec. 585 . . . [p. 234]
That the Royalty Agreement is non-exclusive is undisputed by Morton.
Another test employed by the Courts to determine
the nature of an instrument such as the Royalty Agreement in question is whether the party promises to undertake anything more than to pay a royalty on the ore raised. If not, the instrument is a license, not a lease. Church
v. Goshen Iron Co., 112 Va. 694, 72 S.E. 685 (1911); United States v. 180.37 Acres of Land, More or Less, supra;
Shaw v. Caldwell, 16 Cal. App. 1, 115 Pac. 941 (1911).
Under the Royalty Agreement, Morton agrees only to pay
a royalty on whatever salt it extracts; therefore it is a
license.
Another important fact that supports the conclusion
that the Royalty Agreement is a license is that it gives no
estate or interest to Morton in the salt prior to its recovery or "severance" from the water of the Lake. The Royalty Agreement merely gives Morton permission to take
the salt (if it has a water appropriation right) from the
water of the Lake. Such a "permit" is a license.
In Saxman v. Christmann, 52 Ariz. 149, 79 P.2d
520 (1938), the court had to determine whether an instrument granting the plaintiff the right to mine barium
on forest lands was a license or a lease. The court looked
to the instrument to determine its nature, and held that:
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It authorizes the permittee "to use" the lands, and

defines such use to be for the purpose of the necessary construction of such buildings, houses for
employees, and all other equipment for mining
and shipping from the lands barium for commercial purposes. Throughout the instrument the
occupancy is referred to as a privilege or permission. The permit, we think, is a mere license, at
most. It certainly is not a lease. 79 P.2d 521.

That the Royalty Agreement is not a lease is very
clear. It is well established that there must be an intention evidenced by the instrument to establish a lease, Von
Goerlitz v. Turner, supra, and, although the designation
of an agreement as a "lease" or a "license" is not determinative of its nature, United States v. Atomic Fuel Coal
Co., supra; Boley v. Butterfield, 57 Utah 262, 194 Pac.
128 ( 1920), the designation of the agreement as a "lease"
and the parties as "lessor" and "lessee" has been held to
be an important factor in determining the intent of the
parties as to whether the instrument is intended to constitute a lease. Moore v. Schultz, 22 N. ]. Super. 24, 91
A.2d 514 (1952).
The Royalty Agreement in question does not contain any of the operative words normally associated with
a lease. It is entitled merely an "Agreement;" the word
"lease" is not used in the instrument. The parties are not
referred to as lessee and lessor. Nor are the normal words
of "grant, demise or let" found in the instrument. Finally, there is no specific area or thing granted; Morton
only received the "right" to "appropriate, remove and
divert water of and from the Great Salt Lake for the pur17

pose of extracting salt therefrom . . . " (provided that
it had valid water appropriation rights). Inasmuch as one
of the prerequisites of a lease is that the space being
leased must be definite and defined, In re Red Owl Drug
Co., supra, the lack thereof in the Royalty Agreement is
a definite indication that no lease was created.
Another indication that the Royalty Agreement is
a license and not a lease comes from the Statutes of the
State of Utah. The third paragraph of Section 65-1-15,
Utah Code Annotated (1953) states in part:
Salts and other minerals in the waters of navigable lakes and streams are likewise reserved to
the state and shall be sold by the state land board
only upon a royalty basis. The amount of such
royalties and the terms of such contracts shall be
determined by the board; provided, that all such
contracts shall be subject to the use of waters for
public purposes, . . . [Emphasis added]
Morton contends that the Southern Pacific's point
that the Royalty Agreement merely gives Morton the
right to purchase the salt from the State is "patently without merit." Yet the language of Section 65-1-15 specifically refers to the fact that the salt is to be sold only on a
royalty basis, and calls the Royalty Agreement a contract.
It is clear from the wording of the Statute that the Royalty Agreements are merely non-exclusive licenses to purchase, defining the terms of purchase.
That the Royalty Agreement is not a mineral lease
but a license is also evident from the State of Utah Rules
and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Mineral
Leases, as amended July 1, 1967. Those Rules and Regulations contain the following items, all of which tend to
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show that the Royalty Agreement is not a mineral lease,
but a license:
1.) The term rent is defined in terms of a certain

amount per acre of land leased. (There are no
acres of land referred to in the Royalty Agreement, nor does the word "rent" appear in the
instrument);

2.) Rule IO delineates the type of minerals for
which the State Land Board can grant leases.
(Salt and other minerals contained in water
are not among them);
3.) Rule 22 states that the State Land Board shall
issue leases only in the form provided in Rule
10. (The Royalty Agreement is not in that
form);

4.) Rule 23 is a separate section designated "Royalty Agreement relating to the waters of the
Great Salt Lake" and states that the salts and
other minerals in the waters of the Lake shall
be sold only upon a royalty basis;
5.) Rule 23 refers to salt extractors as "vendees."

The importance of the characterization of the Royalty Agreement is clear. It is established law that a lessee
has an estate in the land for which he can maintain damages sustained by his interest in the property against a
third person or the grantor who injures it. The law is
different where a license is involved, however.
Tiffany, in his treatise Real Property, (3d Ed. 1939)
states in Section 829:
That a licensee, as such, has no right of action
against a third person obstructing his exercise of
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the license privilege is, it is conceived, beyond
question, in spite of the occasional decision to the
contrary. [p. 403]
The mere fact that a license may not be revocable
at will does not change the import of Tiffany's assertion.
In Nahas v. Local 905, 114 Cal. App. 2d 808, 301 P.2d
932 ( 1956), reh. denied, 302 P.2d 829 ( 1956), the court,
citing Tiffany, stated the accepted view on the subject:
The criterion of lease or license is presence or absence of a right of exclusive possession in the
grantee, exclusive as to the landlord as well as
others. When that is absent the agreement spells
a license rather than a lease. Moreover, the fact
that the license is not terminable at will or is
coupled with a lessee's interest, does not destroy
its character or convert it into a lease. 1 Tiffany
on Real Property (3d. Ed.) §79, p. 117: 'A tenancy
involves an interest in the land passed to the tenant and a possession exclusive even of the landlord except as the lease permits his entry, and saving always the landlord's right to enter to demand payment of rent or make repairs. A mere
permission to use land, dominion over it remaining in the owner and no interest in or exclusive
possession of it being given, is but a license . . .
Such a person has not the possession of the land,
this remaining in the licensor, and he has not it
seems, any interest in the land which he can assert as against a third person, that is, he has no
rights in rem. 302 P.2d at p. 830. [Emphasis added]
That Morton cannot maintain its action herein is
shown also by Ct1ledonian Coal Co. v. Rocky Cliff Mining Co., 16 N.M. 517, 120 Pac. 715 (1911). In that case,
the plaintiff sued defendant for the value of quantities of
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coal the defendant had removed from certain property.
The plaintiff claimed ownership of the coal on the
strength of a license to mine the coal granted by a third
party who owned the property in which the coal was
located. The court held that a license gave the licensee
no proprietary interest in the coal until it was severed;
therefore plaintiff had no interest in the coal upon which
to base an action until it severed the coal from the ground
and reduced it to possession. The court held at page 717
that:
The plaintiff did not allege or prove, nor did the
court find, that it was injured as to its possessory
rights; that is, by reason of a disturbance of its
possession simply. The action is brought to recover for the value of coal removed from the land,
and if plaintiff is to recover the value of that coal it
must show some property right or interest in the
coal which is not established by the possession of
the land merely. The reason of this is that coal and
minerals in place are land (Caldwell v. Fulton, 31
Pa. 475, 72 Am. Dec. 760), and their removal by
a trespasser constitutes a permanent injury to the
freehold, for which injury to the owner of the fee
is alone entitled to recover. (Citations omitted)
[Emphasis added]
In Von Goerlitz v. Turner, supra, the court held that

the instrument granting the plaintiff the right to mine
was a license, and that:
The agreement created no personal interest or
right of exclusive possession, either in the mine
or the ore, in plaintiff or his assigns. Being merely
a license to take ore from the mine, plaintiff's right
thereto could arise only if and when it had been
removed by him or his assignors. Wheeler v.
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West, 71 Cal. 126, 11 P. 871. If another removed
the ore, plaintiff could have no complaint, as his
right of severance and removal was not exclusive
"against all the world, including the owner."
[Emphasis added]
The reasoning of the courts in the Von Goerlitz and
Caledonian Coat4 cases was that in order to have a cause
of action, the plaintiff must have a proprietary interest in
the minerals or the land affected. When the plaintiff
merely holds a non-exclusive license, such as Morton, he
can't sue a third person or the licensor for the removal of
the minerals because he has no interest therein until he
has reduced them to possession.
Morton's attempt to distinguish the Von Goerlitz
case on the ground that it went off on a question of form
pleading is invalid, because that issue of the case was
merely the appellant's second contention, unrelated to the
major issue involved, and the decision thereon was framed
as being an alternative reason for the affirmance of the
lower court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.
Morton rejects the holdings in Von Goerlitz and
Caledonian Coal and cites instead on page 36 of its brief
several cases it claims demonstrate the right of a licensee
to recover damages. Those cases do not conflict with the
Caledonian Coal or Von Goerlitz decisions, nor do they
provide Morton with support for its position in this case,
because in each of the cases cited by Morton, the damages
for which the licensee was allowed to recover were either
4These are two of the leading cases on this point. Numerous auth·
orities to the same effect are cited and discussed in these two decisions.
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for physical damage to the licensee's personal property
or an interference with the licensee's possession rights,
neither of which is involved in this case.
Finally, Morton suggests that perhaps the Royalty
Agreement comes within the definition of a profit a prendre, a profit in gross or an incorporeal hereditament, all
of which purportedly would give Morton an interest in
the salt upon which to base its claim against the Southern
Pacific. However, these unsupported labels can give Morton no comfort or raise any doubt as to the limited nature
of Morton's rights under the Royalty Agreement. The
one salient factor which Morton has chosen to ignore
which proves that the Royalty Agreement is not a profit
a prendre, a profit in gross, or an incorporeal hereditament is the fact that all three grant an interest in the
minerals or other profits to be removed from the land
prior to their reduction to possession. Painter v. Pasadena Land and Water Co., 91 Cal. 74, 27 Pac. 539 (1891).
A license, on the other hand, gives no interest in the minerals or other profits to be removed until they are reduced to the licensee's possession. National Memorial Park
v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 1008 (4th Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 324 U.S. 858 (1944).
Furthermore, Morton ignores the distinction between
an exclusive right to sever minerals (Right of Profit) from
a non-exclusive right to sever minerals (Right of Common). See: Tiffany, Real Property, (1 Ed. 1903) Section
335, p. 741. The definition of a profit a prendre cited
by Morton on page 31 of its brief covers the rights of a
holder of a profit a prendre who has a Right of Profit,
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not a Right of Common. Because of the non-exclusive
nature of the Royalty Agreement, if it were a profit a
prendre, which it is not, Morton at best would have a
Right of Common, and thus have no action against a third
person who removed salt and other minerals from the
water of the Lake. As stated by Tiffany in his treatise
Real Property, (3d Ed. 1939) in Section 839:
It is in this respect that a license to sever particular things from the land is to be distinguished
from a profit a prendre, the licensee having no
right to freedom of interference by third persons
or by the landowner himself, the distinction between a license and a profit a prendre being in a
general way similar to that between a license and
an easement. [p. 430]
If Morton had an interest in the salt prior to its reduction to Morton's possession, it would have a cause
of action against every extractor of salt from the Great
Salt Lake, because they would be taking salt in which
Morton had an interest. If Morton's assertion were correct, it would follow that Morton could preclude the State
of Utah from developing the Lake for the benefit of the
State in any way that would diminish the salt content of
the Lake, including the granting of the numerous additional Royalty Agreements which have been issued by the
State Land Board.
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POINT

III.

ANY RIGHTS MORTON MAY HAVE TO
THE SALT IN THE GREAT SALT LAKE ARE
SUBJECT TO THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC'S
CAUSEWAY BY STATUTE.
Section 65-1-15, Utah Code Annotated (1953) states
in part that all royalty contracts "shall be subject to the
use of the waters for public purposes. . . ." Inasmuch as
the Southern Pacific is a public utility, and the causeway
in question was constructed under a Grant of Easement
from and with the approval of the State of Utah for use
in serving the public, the use of the causeway by the
Southern Pacific is for public purposes, and any rights
Morton may have under the Royalty Agreement are by
statute subordinated to that use.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted
that the judgment entered below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Haldor T. Benson
James R. Amschler

Attorneys for DefendantRespondent.
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